Case No. 05-36825.United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
September 8, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER
ROBERT GRANT, Bankruptcy Judge
This matter is before the court on a motion to reopen this case, filed by Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. and the debtor’s objection thereto. Movant wants the court to reopen the case so that it can file a motion, probably pursuant to Rule 60(b), to vacate an order avoiding its judicial lien against debtor’s property. The debtor, understandably, wants that order to remain undisturbed and so opposes the requested reopening.
Section 350 of the Bankruptcy Code speaks to reopening a case after it has been closed. It provides:
A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).
With all of the controversies reflected in the reported decisions, between debtors and creditors, concerning whether or not a case should be reopened for this, that, or another reason, one might think that the act of reopening a bankruptcy case after it has been closed had some tremendous significance. It does not. The purpose of reopening is merely “to continue the bankruptcy proceeding.” In re Income Property Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1982). Reopening a bankruptcy case is a little more than a ministerial function.
The reopening of a case is of no independent legal significance or consequence. . . . The effect of [§ 350(b)] is merely to resurrect the court file from the stacks of the closed cases, or even from the archives, to enable it to receive a new request for relief. The legislative history on the provision is sparse, but it certainly does not contradict [this] benign interpretation. . . . [T]he purpose for reopening a case is to allow the court to act on a substantive request for relief, and . . . the mere reopening,
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by itself, accords no independent relief. In re David, 106 B.R. 126, 128-29 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989).
Such an interpretation concerning the effect of reopening accords with the broad language of § 350(b). A case may be reopened for “cause.” Among the identified causes are the administration of assets or to accord relief to the debtor. This statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. In common usage, the term “cause” means nothing more than “a reason” and it should be so interpreted in § 350(b). Consequently, a case may be reopened if there is a reason to do so. The statute does not require a compelling reason or even a good reason; only a reason. All that is necessary is that there be something for the court to consider, act upon, or to do. Reopening a case only provides an arena within which the disputants can do battle. Who it is that may emerge as the victor from this conflict should not be a function of whether or not the case is reopened but, instead, the substantive merits of the underlying dispute. This attitude toward reopening is particularly appropriate, given the procedural context within which it occurs. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the applicable Rules of Procedure require or even provide for any form of notice concerning the motion or an opportunity to object to it. Such motions are typically granted ex parte. See In Re Keenan, 106 B.R. 239, 241 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
Debtor’s objection is overruled, the motion granted and this case reopened for the purpose of allowing Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. to file a motion to vacate the order avoiding the judicial lien.
SO ORDERED.
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