Case Number: A03-93781-PWB, Adversary Proceeding No. 03-9235.United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.
April 27, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAUL BONAPFEL, Bankruptcy Judge
Robert W. Walker (“Plaintiff”), the Debtor, commenced this adversary proceeding on July 16, 2003, by filing a complaint to determine the dischargeability of tax debt for years 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999 owed to the United States of America (“Defendant”). Defendant filed its answer on August 19, 2003, contending that all the tax debt is nondischargeable under either 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (tax years 1989, 1991-1997) or § 523(a)(1)(A) (tax year 1999). Defendant now seeks partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s 1999 tax liability is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(C). Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion for partial summary judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable herein by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered “if
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the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1999). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270
(11th Cir. 1988). “The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to demonstrate to the [trial] court the basis for its motion for summary judgment and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions which it believes show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . If the movant successfully discharges its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish, by going through the pleadings, that there exist genuine issues of material fact.” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993), reh’g denied, 16 F.3d 1233
(11th Cir. 1994).
Section 523(a)(1)(A) provides that a debt for a tax “of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title” is excepted from discharge. Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) identifies the relevant time period for federal income tax nondischargeability as “for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition.” Thus, tax debt less than three years old is nondischargeable.
Defendant’s records reflect that Plaintiff filed his 1999 tax return on April 15, 2000 (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Exhibit A-38). The record in this case reflects that Plaintiff filed his petition for relief under chapter 7 of Title 11 on April 3, 2003. Plaintiff’s 1999 tax debt was due within three years of the filing of his bankruptcy petition and, as
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a result, is not dischargeable. Accordingly, because there is no dispute as to any material fact, Defendant is entitled to entry of summary judgment as to the nondischargeability of Plaintiff’s 1999 federal tax liability. Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s 1999 federal tax liability is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).
The Clerk is directed to serve copies of this Order on counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant.