Case No. 03-70694United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. Illinois.
July 1, 2003
OPINION
LARRY LESSEN, Bankruptcy Judge
The issue before the Court is whether the proceeds of a Whistleblower action are exempt pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4), which allows exemptions for payments “on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor.”
The Debtor, Linette Metzger, filed a petition pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 13, 2003. In Schedule C — Personal Property Claim As Exempt, the Debtor claimed a $7,500 exemption in a personal injury action valued at $138,379 under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4). The Trustee objected to the claim of exemption because it was not for “personal bodily injury”.
The personal injury action in question, Metzger v. State of Illinois, Department of State Police et al., No. 98-3297, alleged sexual discrimination, harassment, and retaliation suffered by the Debtor during her employment with the Illinois State Police. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the Debtor and against certain officials of the State Police under the Illinois Personnel Code — Whistleblower Act in the amount of $138,379. The judgment itemized the damages as follows:
Pain and suffering experienced $ 10,000
Loss of normal life experienced $ 10,000
Emotional distress experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future $117,000
Value of time and earnings lost $ 1,087
Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and services received $ 292
735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Personal Property Exempt. The following personal property, owned by the debtor, is exempt from judgment, attachment or distress for rent:
(h) The debtor’s right to receive, or property that is traceable to:
(4) a payment, not to exceed $7,500 in value, on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor. . . .
This Court discussed the statutory interpretation of 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) in In re Langa, 222 B.R. 843 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 1998):
Because this case involves an issue of statutory interpretation, the Court’s task is to give effect to the will of the Illinois legislature. The statutory text is the best evidence of a statute’s purpose. Courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Matter of Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp., 63 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1995). In the absence of statutory definitions indicating a different legislative intent, words in a statute are to be given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill.2d 1, 585 N.E.2d 51, 57 (1991).
Black’s Law Dictionary 786 (6th ed. 1990) defines “bodily injury” as generally referring to “[p]hysical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition”. “Physical” is defined as “[r]elating or pertaining to the body, as distinguished from the mind or soul or the emotions”. Black’s Law Dictionary at 1147. “Personal injury” is defined as follows:
In a narrow sense, a hurt or damage done to a man’s person, such as a cut or a bruise, a broken limb, or the like, as distinguished from an injury to his property or his reputation. The phrase is chiefly used in this connection with actions of tort for negligence and under worker’s compensation statutes. But the term is also used (usually in statutes) in a much wider sense, and as including any injury which is an invasion of personal rights, and in this signification it may include such injuries to the person as libel or slander, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and mental suffering.
Black’s Law Dictionary at 786.
Id. at 845. The Court rejected Ms. Langa’s claim of exemptions in sexual harassment and employment discrimination claims:
The basis for Ms. Langa’s suit was not bodily injury; she did not allege any type of physical injury or impairment of physical condition. Rather, the injuries claimed by Ms. Langa were psychological or emotional, and the Illinois legislature chose not to exempt these injuries.
Id.
In an analogous case, Judge Squires found that claims for defamation, breach of contract, severe mental distress, humiliation, embarrassment, great mental anguish and suffering did not constitute “personal bodily injury”:
Rather, these injuries are more emotional in nature. Thus, the Court construes the meaning of § 12-1001(h)(4) to be restricted to actual physical bodily injury as opposed to broadening it to include mental anguish and distress attendant to claims for damage to reputation, invasion of privacy and breach of contract.
In re Chapman, 223 B.R. 137, 140 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1998).
The Debtor admits that she “did not allege in the pleadings that physical injury occurred.” However, the Debtor asserts that “it is clear that the jury awarded her damages based upon pain and suffering which would have to be associated with physical injury.”
This argument is based on the fallacy that pain and suffering can only arise from bodily injury, not from emotional or psychological injury. See Heldenbrand v. Roadmaster Corp., 277 Ill. App.3d 664, 214 Ill. Dec. 405
(1996) (damages awarded for emotional pain and suffering caused by retaliatory discharge for filing workers’ compensation claim); Kritzen v. Flender Corp., 226 Ill. App.3d 541, 168 Ill. Dec. 509 (1992). The pain and suffering experienced by the Debtor in this proceeding arose from the emotional distress which followed the violations of the Whistleblower Act, not from a bodily injury.
735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) plainly limits a debtor’s claim of exemption to the right to receive payments “on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor.” Violations of the Whistleblower Act do not result in bodily injury. Therefore, the Debtor did not receive a bodily injury in this proceeding, and she cannot exempt any of the judgment proceeds under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4).
For the foregoing reasons, the Trustee’s Objection to Claim of Exemption under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) is sustained.
This Opinion is to serve as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
See written Order.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in an Opinion entered this day,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to Claim of Exemption under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) be and is hereby sustained.