BANKR. CASE NO. 04-54504-LMC, (JOINTLY ADMINISTERED).United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.
April 24, 2008
ORDER DENYING ROBERT G. COSHOTT’S SECOND MOTION FOR RELIEF
LEIF CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge
Almost two years after this court granted an objection to a proof of claim filed by Robert G. Coshott,[1] Mr. Coshott filed a motion to vacate that order.[2] This court held a hearing on February 6, 2008 and, after reviewing the pleadings, the relevant case law, the history of the jointly-administered bankruptcy cases, and the additional evidence offered by counsel for Coshott, the court
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denied Coshott’s first motion to vacate.[3] Ten days after the entry of that order,[4] Coshott filed the present motion, which turns out to be, in effect, a second motion to vacate. Because that motion was filed within 10 days of the order denying hi first motion to vacate, the court reviews the second motion under Rule 59(e), made applicable to bankruptcy procedure by Bankruptcy Rule 9023. See Abraham v. Aguilar (Matter of Aguilar), 861 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1989); Stangel v. U.S. (In re Stangel), 68 F.3d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9023.
Under Rule 59(e), a court has the discretion to amend its previous judgment or order if the movant establishes some manifest error of law or fact justifying such an amendment. See Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d by 735 F.2d 1367 (7th Cir. 1984)). In pointing out the court’s error, however, “[i]t is not the purpose of allowing motions for reconsideration to enable a party to complete presenting his case after the court has ruled against him.” Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
Rather than arguing that this court erred as a matter of law or as a matter of fact in rendering its first ruling, Coshott offers “new” arguments and evidence which go to the merits of his first motion to vacate — he purports to have new evidence mitigating any prejudice to creditors in vacating the order granting the debtors’ objection to his proof of claim.[5] His arguments, however, are not new, and the evidence ostensibly supporting his argument is neither evidence unavailable to
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him before nor is it evidence ignored by this court in its prior ruling.[6] In all events, Coshott has not established how this court’s prior ruling was tainted by a manifest error of law or fact. Accordingly, the motion to reconsider and to vacate this court’s order of February 12, 2008 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
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